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An Introduction to Identity Assurance
Dr. Rodney G. McDuff
Strategic Technologies Group, UQ
AAF Project Architect
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• What is (Digital) Identity?
• Relying Parties and Assurances.
• Grand Unified Theory.
• Measures of Assurances.
• Exemplars of Measure of Assurances.
• US Government Authentication Framework.
• Gatekeeper and AGAF.
• The AAF and Identity Assurances.
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• Some definitions from the “The Laws of Identity”
<http://www.identityblog.com>
– Developed by Kim Cameron (Identity and Access Architect, 
Microsoft Corporation) and many other Identity specialists.
• A “Digital Identity” is a “set of claims made by one digital 
subject about itself or another digital subject”.
– Eg: U of Q claims Rodney McDuff is an employee.
• A “Digital Subject” is a “person or thing represented or 
existing in the digital realm which is being described or 
dealt with.”
– Eg: People, devices, computers, digital resources, policies and 
relationships between other Digital Subjects, …
• A Subject is the “central substance or core of a thing as 
opposed to its attributes”.
What is (Digital) Identity?
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• A “Claim” is an “assertion of the truth of 
something, typically one which is disputed or in 
doubt.”
– An identifier: student number, username.
– Personal information: name, address, DoB, 
citizenship.
– Group membership: >18 years, team member, 
enrolled in PHYS1000.
– Holder-of-Key: Subject can prove possession and 
control of a (cryptographic) key.
• Attributes are things expressed in claims.
• Claims need to be evaluated by the party relying 
on them.
What is (Digital) Identity?
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In an Enterprise all processes are in same security domainIn an Enterprise all processes are in same security domain
Identity Management and 
Access Meta-Processes
Governance/
Policy
Resource/
Relying PartyTransportAttributes Authentication
Identification/
Credentialing
CAUDIT Identity Management Workshop. 18-19/08/2008 6
In a Federated environment processes are in different security domainsIn a Federated environment processes are in different security domains
Identity Management and 
Access Meta-Processes
Governance/
Policy
Resource/
Relying PartyTransportAttributes Authentication
Identification/
Credentialing
This creates many complexities to overcome especially for the Relying Party.This creates many complexities to overcome especially for the Relying Party.
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Relying Parties
Resource/
Relying Party
• Part of RP’s Business Case is to allow access to 
its Resource(s).
• But only to a defined audience defined by the 
RP’s Business Case and Risk Assessment
– Some RP’s Resource(s) are low risk.
– Some will be high risk.
• Bottom line: RP owns most of the risk in 
transaction.
• RP needs to evaluate Claims (in the form of 
attributes) before allowing or denying access.
• RP also needs to have an understanding of the 
environment in which claims were created and 
transported to it.
• This understanding helps to assure the RP that 
claims can be trusted.
• “Trust, but verify”. – Ronald Reagan.
CAUDIT Identity Management Workshop. 18-19/08/2008 8
Transport
Assurances: Transport
Resource/
Relying Party
• Shibboleth: 
– Metadata defines end-points (IdP,SP)
– It identifies of end-points.
• Details which EE certs (and their chains and 
trust roots) represent each end-point for 
mutual authentication and encryption over 
TLS.
• For each IdP details which EE cert (and its 
chain and trust root) digitally signs claim 
(assertion). 
– Metadata itself is digitally signed.
– How are end-points identified?
– How do end-points generate and protect their 
keying materials?
– Is the metadata signed securely?
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Authentication Transport
Assurances: Authentication
Resource/
Relying Party
• Authentication is an act of proof of 
possession and control of a credential/token 
issued in identification phase.
• A claim is usually generated after a 
successfully authentication and transported 
to RP.
• In an enterprise environment, RP usually 
has direct knowledge of authentication 
strength or its management life cycle.
• In a federated environment RP does not 
have direct knowledge of authentication 
strength or its management life cycle.
• What is the strength of the authentication 
token so I can understand my risks?
• How is the token’s life-cycle managed?
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Attributes Transport
Assurances: Attributes
Resource/
Relying Party
• After a person has been identity vetted they 
typically start accruing attributes as the identity 
is registered in various Systems of Records.
Authentication
6CAUDIT Identity Management Workshop. 18-19/08/2008 11
Interlude: System of Record. (SoR)
• System of Record is an “information storage system which is the 
authoritative data source for a given data element or piece of 
information”.
• Your HR and SIS systems are examples of SoRs.
• Some institutions are lucky to have just one. Most have many. (UQ 
currently has 7). 
– Most SoRs are different applications in different OUs focused on different 
classes of people.
– Use different processes to populate and manage.
– Use different access control regimes. 
– Have difference audit requirements.
• A meta-directory is usually required to combine multiple identity data from 
SoRs into a single digital identity which is usually published in an LDAP 
directory.
• Elements of which are asserted to an Relying Party.
• Understanding the assertion’s entire life cycle (ie who did what to whom 
and when) is complex.
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Interlude: Authoritative Data Sources
• Question to the audience: 
Which of your SoRs is authoritative for a user’s name?
– Answer: None!!
• In theory, should only assert data for which you are 
authoritative.
• However, your IdM process should provide enough evidence 
to confidently assert user’s name and to provide assurance to 
RP.
– “Proxy” authoritative data source for convenience. 
– To make everything work.
• Similarly there must be enough evidence to confidently assert 
data whose authoritative source lies outside the enterprise.
– Case in point: eduPersonEntitlement.
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Attributes Transport
Assurances: Attributes
Resource/
Relying Party
• After a person has been identity vetted, they 
typically start accruing attributes as the identity 
is registered in various Systems of Records.
• These attributes will make up an claim which is 
asserted to the RP.
• RP will consume assertion and must understand 
it  before allowing or deny access.
• Is attribute ontology consistent across asserters?
Authentication
• What is veracity of the claim so I can understand 
my risks?
• An RP may receive incorrect data in claim which 
allows erroneous  access to resource. 
• Is there a mechanism to debug problem with 
asserter?
• Is there enough audit logs for asserter to help 
debug claim?
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Identification/
Credentialing Transport
Assurances: Identification
Attributes Authentication
Resource/
Relying Party
• Identity vetting core subject usually with 
Evidence of Identity (EoI) or Evidence of 
Relationship (EoR) documents. (aka Breeder 
documents.)
–Passport, Driver’s license, Birth Certificate.
–References from trusted entities, Known Customer.
• After a successful ID vetting subject is usually 
issued credential(s) used to prove identity. 
• What is the strength of the identification 
process so I can understand my risks?
• Is credential(s) transported to subject 
securely?
• When will  assertions of identity stop after 
the subject leaves the enterprise? 
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Governance/
Policy Transport
Assurances: Governance and Policy
Attributes
Resource/
Relying Party
• Creates and maintains the set of agreed rules 
which provide a foundation upon which 
everything works.
• Defines who can participate as end-points and 
end-users.
• Defines expectations and requirements for all 
parties.
• Defines which technologies and which standards
• Defines dispute resolution processes.
• Defines privacy related issues.
• Defines support processes for all parties.
Authentication
Identification/
Credentialing
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GUT of Assurances
• A Hilbert Space approach. (David Hilbert 1862-1943)
– Abstract infinite-dimensional vector space.
– Used by mathematicians and physicists to conceptualise, simplify and understand 
complex systems.
• For a user u authenticating at some time t with credential q and transporting claim 
consisting of n(t) attributes using transport profile p.
• Assurance is composed of smaller vector spaces for each process.
Too much information to send over the wire. Will just confuse RP. Need to simplify it.Too much information to send over the wire. Will just confuse RP. Need to simplify it.
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First Simplification
•Assurances due to 
Governance is a constant 
for ever user.
•Don’t transport to RP over 
wire.
•Transport out-of-band in 
governance and policy 
documents.
•Assurances due to 
Governance is a constant 
for ever user.
•Don’t transport to RP over 
wire.
•Transport out-of-band in 
governance and policy 
documents.
•Assurance due to Transport 
are the a small set of 
constants for every user.
•Don’t transport to RP over 
wire.
•Transport out-of-band in 
governance and policy 
documents.
•Assurance due to Transport 
are the a small set of 
constants for every user.
•Don’t transport to RP over 
wire.
•Transport out-of-band in 
governance and policy 
documents.
•Assurance due to Attributes 
very very complicated.
•Difficult to find a way to 
simplify this complexity.
•Federation should “deem” 
that Assurance due to 
Attributes is a constant. 
• Implies each IdP is doing 
the best job it can and RPs
will have to trust this.
•If it’s a constant don’t 
transport to RP over wire.
•Assurance due to Attributes 
very very complicated.
•Difficult to find a way to 
simplify this complexity.
•Federation should “deem” 
that Assurance due to 
Attributes is a constant. 
• Implies each IdP is doing 
the best job it can and RPs
will have to trust this.
•If it’s a constant don’t 
transport to RP over wire.
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• A Measure (or Metric) is the “means of estimating the magnitude of some 
attribute of an object”.
– “When you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you 
know something about it; but when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is 
of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind; it may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have 
scarcely in your thoughts advanced to the state of science”.    – Lord Kelvin
– A measure allows one to objectively judge if one object is bigger than another.
• Consider a circle. It’s a 2D object that have (atleast) 3 measures.
– A radius r, a circumference 2πr and an area πr2
• Each is a perfectly good measure for a circle.
• Can be use to differentiate size of a circle.
• But which one to choose? 
– Use the one most suited to your use-case.
• For Identity Assurances in a Federation (IMHO)
– First priority; measures that most suites your federation’s use-case.
– Second priority; measures that most suites inter-federating with your local 
federations (government, education, health).
– Third priority; that most suites inter-federating with other international 
federations
Interlude: Measures
10
CAUDIT Identity Management Workshop. 18-19/08/2008 19
Second Simplification
• Define a measure for Assurances due to Identification.
– Transmit this information to RP to provide Identification Assurance.
• Define a measure for Assurances due to Authentication.
– Transmit this information to RP to provide Authentication Assurance.
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Exemplars: US E-Authentication 
Framework.
• Defined in OMB M-04-04 and NIST SP800-63.
• Defines 4 Identity LoAs:
– ID LoA 1: No identify proofing require.
– ID LoA 2: Identity proofing required. In-person presentation of 
identifying materials or information. Must have government picture ID 
and Address-of-Record or nationality. (eg driver’s licence or passport);
– ID LoA 3: Same as ID LoA 2 but require verification of identifying 
materials and information.
– ID LoA 4: Same as ID LoA 3 but require 2 independent ID documents 
and a new biometric.
• Parallel set of requirements for remote identity 
proofing.
11
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Exemplars: US E-Authentication 
Framework.
• Defines 4 Authentication LoAs:
–Based on resistance to protocol threats.
Such as Eavesdropping, Password Guessing, Replays attacks, Hijacking attacks, 
Verifier Impersonation attacks, Man-in-the-middle attacks.
–AuthN LoA 1: Weak passwords.
• No clear text passwords. 
• Probability of success of password guess attack < 2-10 over life-time passwd
–AuthN LoA 2: Strong passwords.
• Same as LoA 1 but Probability of success of password guess attack < 2-14.
• Password have >= 10 bit on min-entropy.
–AuthN LoA 3: weak 2-factor tokens.
• {Hard,Soft}-cryptographic tokens “FIPS 140-2 Level 1” or greater + LoA 2 
passphrase.
• Hard-cryptographic tokens “FIPS 140-2 Level 2” of greater + > LoA 1 
password over TLS.
• One-time password tokens “FIPS 140-2 Level 1” or greater. Greater > 106 
generated passwords.
–AuthN LoA 4: Strong 2-factor tokens.
• Only Hard-cryptographic tokens “FIPS 140-2 Level 3” physical security and 
Level 2 everywhere else.
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Exemplars: US E-Authentication 
Framework.
• Defines Risk Levels and maps them to LoAs
HighModLowN/AHarm to agency programs or public interests
HighModLowN/AUnauthorized release of sensitive information
Mod
High
LowN/AN/APersonal Safety
HighModModLowFinancial loss or agency liability
HighModLowN/ACivil or criminal violations
HighModModLowInconvenience, distress or damage to standing or reputation
4321Potential Impact Categories for Authentication Errors
Assurance Level Impact 
Profiles
• Required LoA determined by lowest LoA whose impact profile meets or exceeds 
the potential impact for every category analysed in the risk assessment
• NIH has applications ranging over the whole LoA spectrum.
– Driving InCommon federation to implement Bronze (LoA 1) and Silver (LoA 2).
– Users of LoA 3&4 applications need another Identity Provider.
– Less of a problem for AAF as we will do high LoAs as well.
12
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Interlude: Australian Financial Transaction 
Reports Act 1988. (The 100pts system)
Evidence of Identity.
• Birth Certificate or Passport: 70pts.
• An identification card issued by the 
Commonwealth, a State or Territory: 
40pts.
• An identification card issued to a 
student at a tertiary education 
institution: 40pts.
• An identification card issued to a 
staff at a tertiary education 
institution: 40pts.
• Credit Card: 25pts.
Evidence of Relationship.
• Known customer for last 3 years: 
100pts.
• Signed written reference from an 
acceptable referee or verified 
signatory stating knowledge of 
customer for at least 1 year : 40pts.
• Records from a current employer, or 
a previous employer within the last 2 
years: 35pts.
• Known student within last 10 years: 
25pts.
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Exemplars: Gatekeeper and Australian 
Government Authentication Framework
• Gatekeeper is the Australian Government PKI Framework
– Certificate Categories broadly aligned to the AGAF 4 levels of risk.
• General: 100pts including a 70pts document.
• High Assurance: 150pts including a 70pts document + signature verification check + 
photo check.
• AGAF published “Australian Government e-Authentication 
Framework for Individuals” as a discussion paper in December 2005. 
–Defines 4 levels of Risk levels that are mapped to LoAs.
High confidence in 
the assertion
Moderate confidence 
in the assertion
Some confidence in 
the assertion
No requirement for 
confidence in the 
assertion
High RiskModerate RiskLow RiskMinimal Risk
Level 4Level 3Level 2Level 1
13
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Exemplars: Gatekeeper and Australian 
Government Authentication Framework
•substantial inconvenience 
to any party
•risk to any party’s personal 
safety
•the release of personally or 
commercially sensitive data 
to third parties
•substantial financial loss 
to any party
•substantial damage to any 
party’s standing or 
reputation
•substantial distress being 
caused to any party
•significant threat to 
government agencies’ 
systems or agencies’ 
capacity to conduct their 
business
•could assist a crime or 
hinder its detection.
•significant inconvenience 
to any party
•no risk to any party’s 
personal safety
•the release of personally or 
commercially sensitive data 
to third parties
•significant financial loss to 
any party
•significant damage to any 
party’s standing or 
reputation
•significant distress being 
caused to any party
•moderate threat to 
government agencies’ 
systems or agencies’ 
capacity to conduct their 
business
•could assist a crime or 
hinder its detection.
•minor inconvenience to 
any party
•no risk to any party’s 
personal safety
•no release of personally or 
commercially sensitive data 
to third parties
•minor financial loss to any 
party
•minor damage to any 
party’s standing or 
reputation
•minor distress being 
caused to any party
•no threat to government 
agencies’ systems or 
agencies’ capacity to 
conduct their business
•would not assist a crime or 
hinder its detection.
•minimal inconvenience to 
any party
•no risk to any party’s 
personal safety
•no release of personally or 
commercially sensitive data 
to third parties
•minimal financial loss to 
any party•
•no damage to any party’s 
standing or reputation
•no distress being caused 
to any party
•no threat to government 
agencies’ systems or 
agencies’ capacity to 
conduct their business
•would not assist a crime or 
hinder its detection.
Level 4
High Risk
Level 3
Moderate Risk
Level 2
Low Risk
Level 1 
Minimal Risk
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Exemplars: Gatekeeper and Australian 
Government Authentication Framework
AGAF-(I) also maps E-authentication methods into same 
4 levels. Some relevant examples below:
Moderate to 
high
Multi-mechanism e-authentication.
Moderate to 
high
Digital signature, with the private key stored in hardware 
and PIN-protected.
Low to 
moderate
Digital signature, with the private key stored in approved 
software.
Low to 
moderate
Username/password pairs, with one-time passwords 
stored on paper or calculated within a token
Minimal to lowUsername/password pairs.
HighUsing digital signatures, with the private key stored in 
hardware and biometrics-protected.
LoAMechanism
14
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Australian Access Federation
Considering a model aligned with NIST SP800-63 authentication LoAs, 
Gatekeeper ID LoAs and AGAF Risk Assessment.
Requirements on end user
• End users are not required to go through a face to face verification of identity
Example: A student being enrolled in at least one subject is sufficient to meet this level.
• End users must notify their Identity Registrar if their password has been lost or 
compromised.
Requirements on Institution
• Responsible for the maintenance of currency of user accounts and attributes eg, changing 
the eduPersonAffiliation value if a student moves to become astaff member.
• Pro-actively manage the currency and security of user accounts, and disable an account if 
a breach is detected or if an end-user leaves the institution.
The authentication for this level includes 
authentication using passwords with a 
minimum of six characters (with at least one 
letter and one number).
The Identity for this level includes assertion 
of the user’s identity done by a federation 
Identity Provider (i.e. user’s institution); no 
self assertion by end users will be accepted
Floor 
of 
Trust
Authentication DescriptionIdentification DescriptionLoA
Sti
ll U
nde
r D
isc
uss
ion
Sti
ll U
nde
r D
isc
uss
i n
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Australian Access Federation
Requirements on end user
• End users must provide proof of identity by appearing IN PERSON at their institution’s Identity 
Registrar. 
Example: Short term contractors at an institution requiring access to PKI-protected systems 
whose credentials are insufficient credentials to meet the100 points check but can provide some 
credentials (e.g. drivers licence, credit card, etc).
• End users must notify their Identity Registrar if their computer has suffered a security breach; 
and/or if their password has been lost or compromised.
Requirements on Institution
• Determine who will perform the Identity Registrar role at their institution.• 
• Record the level of identity proofing provided by the end user.•
• Responsible for the maintenance of currency of user accounts and attributes eg, changing the 
eduPersonAffiliation value if a student moves to become a staff member.• 
• Pro-actively manage the currency and security of user accounts, and disable an account if a 
breach is detected or if an end-user leaves the institution.
This level of authentication includes best 
practice and managed password based 
systems.
This level corresponds to an identity asserted by 
a federation Identity Provider for which a trusted 
Identity Registrar has carried out an in-person 
identity proofing that might not meet the 100 point 
test, or the subject’s identity is based on a 
continuous relationship with the Identity Provider 
organization for a period of less than three years.
Level
2
Authentication DescriptionIdentification DescriptionLoA
Sti
ll U
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r D
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uss
ion
Sti
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uss
ion
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Australian Access Federation
Requirements on end user
• End users must provide proof of identity by appearing IN PERSON at their institution’s Identity 
Registrar.
• End user must accrue at least 100 points of identity. Example: Foreign staff with valid passports 
and drivers license.
• End users must notify their Identity Registrar if their computer has suffered a security breach and 
request a new X509 certificate.
• End users must notify their Identity Registrar if their certificate private key has been lost or 
compromised.
Requirements on Institution
• Determine who will perform the Identity Registrar role at their institution.
• Record the level of identity proofing provided by the end user.
• Responsible for the maintenance of currency of user accounts, certificates and attributes.
• Pro-actively manage the currency and security of user accounts, and disable an account if a 
breach is detected or if an end-user leaves the institution.
• Disable compromised certificates and reissue the user with a new certificate
This level of authentication includes two-factor 
systems using hard tokens or software based X.509  
certificates in conjunction with pass-phrases or 
pins.
This level corresponds to an identity asserted by a 
federation Identity Provider for which a trusted 
Identity Registrar has carried out an in-person identity 
proofing meeting the 100 point test, or the subject’s 
identity is based on a continuous relationship with 
the Identity Provider organization for  a of greater 
than three years
Level
3
Authentication DescriptionIdentification DescriptionLoA
Sti
ll U
nde
r D
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ion
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Australian Access Federation
Requirements on end user
• End users must provide proof of identity by appearing IN PERSON at their institution’s Identity Registrar.
• End user must accrue more than 100 points of identity.
• End User must provide evidence proving the extra check done by an external body.
• End users must notify their Identity Registrar if their computer has suffered a security breach;
• End users must notify their Identity Registrar if their crypto token has been lost or stolen.
Requirements on Institution
• Determine who will perform the Identity Registrar role at their institution.
• Record the level of identity proofing provided by the end user including external body checking records.
• Responsible for the maintenance of currency of user accounts, certificates and attributes.
• Pro-actively manage the currency and security of user accounts, and disable an account if a breach is detected or if 
an end-user leaves the institution.
• Disable compromised certificates and reissue the user with a new certificate.
• Replace lost crypto token.
This level of authentication includes hardware based 
X.509 certificate systems, such as crypto tokens.
This level corresponds to an identity asserted by a 
federation Identity Provider for which a trusted 
Identity Registrar has carried out an in-person identity 
proofing exceeding the 100 point test, and the 
subjects identity has gone through extra verification 
and security checking by an external body, such as 
Police, government, etc
Level
4
Authentication DescriptionIdentification DescriptionLoA
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Questions?
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Laws of Identity
1. User Control and Consent:
Digital identity systems must only reveal information identifying a user with the user’s 
consent. 
2. Limited Disclosure for Limited Use:
The solution which discloses the least identifying information and best limits its use is the 
most stable, long-term solution. 
3. The Law of Fewest Parties:
Digital identity systems must limit disclosure of identifying information to parties having a 
necessary and justifiable place in a given identity relationship. 
4. Directed Identity:
A universal identity meta-system must support both “omnidirectional” identifiers for use 
by public entities and “unidirectional” identifiers for private entities, thus facilitating 
discovery while preventing unnecessary release of correlation handles. 
5. Pluralism of Operators and Technologies:
A universal identity meta-system must channel and enable the interworking of multiple 
identity technologies run by multiple identity providers. 
6. Human Integration:
A unifying identity meta-system must define the human user as a component integrated 
through protected and unambiguous human-machine communications. 
7. Consistent Experience Across Contexts:
A unifying identity meta-system must provide a simple consistent experience while 
enabling separation of contexts through multiple operators and technologies. 
